Several of the cells in https://w3cping.github.io/privacy-threat-model/#model-cross-site-recognition are currently possible (in some or all browsers), but we either have concrete plans to make them impossible, or we're actively working on finding ways to make them impossible.

For example, in browsers that still allow third-party cookies, loading iframes on both sides of a navigation currently allows a tracker to transfer a user ID between those frames. We know how to prevent this and have a plan to do so. We can mark this with … maybe a ⏳ emoji indicating that time is running out?
On the other hand, an attacker who can run Javascript as the first party on both sides of a navigation can transfer an ID through query parameters. We'd like to block this link decoration, but (as far as I know) we don't yet have any better ideas than stripping query parameters like fbclid or clearing storage tainted by any query parameter. We could mark these open research questions with … 🤔?
We should be sure not to compromise API designers' ability to use the table to see what capability/goals pairs they must not allow (anything other than a "✓"). Maybe we should mark those with a background, or add a checkbox to the document to turn all the "don't allow this" squares back into "✘"s.
We should be sure to mark all these states with an accurate aria-label and/or title to make them easier to read. I think making each of them into a parameterized Bikeshed include file will make it easier to keep everything consistent.