Pwning ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer Control Centre and R... #1645
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
This article walks through the discovery and exploitation of multiple Windows vulnerabilities in OEM utilities from ASUS, MSI, Acer, and Razer, focusing on how browser ↔ localhost bridges, custom IPC protocols, and privileged services are implemented and then abused. All proof‑of‑concept exploits are available in the bloatware-pwn repository 🎁.
ASUS DriverHub – Browser‑to‑localhost RCE (CVE‑2025‑3462, CVE‑2025‑3463)
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🔧 Technical Details
1. Exploiting Browser→localhost Architectures via Weak Origin/Host Validation.
Many desktop apps, like ASUS DriverHub, expose privileged HTTP APIs on
127.0.0.1and gate them only by checking theOriginheader or a download URL’s host. If those checks use naïve substring logic (e.g.,if origin.contains(".asus.com")), an attacker can register domains likeexploit.asus.com.attacker.tldand host malicious pages there. When a victim visits the site, their browser setsOrigin: http(s)://exploit.asus.com.attacker.tld, which passes the substring check. The attacker can then usefetchor XHR to call sensitive localhost endpoints, such as/asus/v1.0/Rebootor/asus/v1.0/UpdateApp, with crafted JSON bodies to drive installs, reboots, or even arbitrary code execution entirely from the browser.2. Bypassing “Signed Only” Enforcement by Cloning Certificates when 🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
abusing-auto-updaters-and-ipc.mdwith four new subsections covering: browser-to-localhost CSRF against ASUS DriverHub’s HTTP API, certificate-cloning abuse of its UpdateApp endpoint, MSI Center’s TOCTOU race in CMD_AutoUpdateSDK, and insecurity across MSI Center TCP and Acer Control Centre named-pipe IPC (including impersonation-level flips).No other files were modified.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.